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This project was launched to determine how existing ‘best practice’ 
principles – informed by both expert academic thinking and local/regional 
experience – relating to transitional justice can be applied to prevent the 
proceedings of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) causing 
inter-community tensions, political instability and civil unrest in Kosovo. 
Comprising a series of interviews and workshops, this project focused on 
establishing; 
● how transitional justice initiatives ​should​ be presented to their 
subject populations to maximise both understanding and popular 
support, 
 
● how the KSC ​is​ actually engaging in outreach, 
 
● how civil society and the general public in Kosovo and Serbia view 
the efforts made to date by both the KSC and the Government of 
Kosovo in explaining the working methods of the KSC and 
bolstering its popular legitimacy. 
The research comprised a series of interviews and workshops, and it is 
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Truth and Reconciliation Process 





 Background to the Specialist Chambers 
In 2011 the Council of Europe published the ‘​Marty Report​’, which alleged that before, 
during and after NATO’s intervention in 1999, crimes against humanity were 
perpetrated by the KLA against Serbs but also Albanians. As a result, the US and the 
EU established a ‘Special Investigative Task Force’, which recommended in ​ ​July 2014 
that criminal proceedings be initiated. There followed an international campaign to 
persuade the government of Kosovo to establish a special court; after ​ ​a series of 
failed attempts ​, the KSC was established by the Kosovo Assembly in August 2015. 
The KSC has jurisdiction over crimes committed between January 1, 1998 and 
December 31, 2000. 
  
The KSC is described as a ‘ ​hybrid ​’ court because, although established by the 
Assembly of Kosovo and based on Kosovo’s constitution and laws, it is located in The 
Hague, paid for by the EU, and staffed by non-Kosovo citizens. The choice of location 
and personnel was justified as necessary to ensure the court’s impartiality and guard 
against intimidation. The KSC became fully operational in 2017, although it has ​ ​yet to 
issue any indictments ​. 
 
The KSC has been the subject of significant controversy within Kosovo, particularly 
among the majority ​ ​Albanian population ​. In December 2017, ​ ​a group of Albanian MPs 
in the Kosovo Assembly attempted to revoke the KSC; the effort was abandoned 
following international pressure, particularly from the ‘Quint’ states (the US, Britain, 




 Lessons of Transitional Justice 
Since the end of the Cold War, transitional justice has achieved​ ​increased 
prominence​, such that it is​ ​described by the EU ​ as “an integral part of state- and 
peace-building [that] should also be embedded in the wider crisis response, conflict 
prevention, security and development efforts of the EU”. 
  
What is Transitional Justice? 
Transitional Justice takes ​ ​many forms​, from truth and reconciliation initiatives to 
punitive criminal proceedings. Arguably the most widely used definition of transitional 
justice – and that employed by the EU in its​ ​most recent policy statement ​ – is the 
UN’s ​, as advanced by the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2004, namely, 
…the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These 
may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels 
of international involvement (and none at all) and individual prosecutions, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a 
combination thereof. 
  
At the core of transitional justice, therefore, are three key principles; accountability, 
justice and reconciliation. In the longer term, transitional justice is seen as a means by 
which post-conflict societies can establish effective domestic judicial systems.  These 
elements are reflected in the EU’s four “​essential elements of transitional justice​”, 




 Why is Transitional Justice Necessary? 
The normative basis for transitional justice rests on two key claims; first, determining 
the truth about past crimes and identifying – and punishing – perpetrators is a ​moral 
imperative​. Those who have committed crimes, it is argued, must be held to account 
so that their victims can achieve justice. Second, transitional justice is presented as 
necessary on the grounds of ​security​; proponents argue that unresolved grievances 
and unpunished criminality will inevitably generate future tension and instability. 
Indeed, ​ ​Kofi Annan argued​ that long-term peace “cannot be achieved” without 
redress for past grievances. This sentiment is echoed by the​ ​EU’s own prescriptions 
which claim “there cannot be lasting peace without justice”. 
  
This latter point was repeatedly emphasised by people working for organisations that 
are supportive of transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia; as Marijana Toma 
noted, “we have experienced the effects of sweeping everything under the carpet, 
especially after the Second World War…[this] was one of the main causes of the 
conflicts in the 1990s”. The legacy of the animosity generated by the conflicts in the 
1990s is, according to Jovana Prusina of the Belgrade-based Youth Initiative for 
Human Rights, “killing our societies slowly because it is affecting us all”. Likewise, 
Bekim Blakaj, Executive Director of the Humanitarian Law Center in Kosovo, 
suggested it was “easy” for each community in the former Yugoslavia to create myths 
about what happened in the 1990s and without any formal transitional justice process, 




 What Makes Transitional Justice Effective? 
Within the academic literature on transitional justice and policy prescriptions 
advanced by international organisations, three recommendations of particular 
relevance to the KSC stand out. First, there is widespread consensus that for 
transitional justice to achieve reconciliation – rather than only justice and 
accountability – ​an array of mechanisms ​ must be employed; while criminal 
proceedings are a key part of transitional justice, they must be complemented by 
additional processes designed to enable communities to express grievances, and 
crucially, engage with – and ultimately understand – the experiences of the other 
groups involved. 
  
Second, it is widely acknowledged that transitional justice processes can only 
succeed if they are supported by the national authorities, who must ensure there is a 
role for, and support from, the ​ ​general public and civil society​. As noted by Anna 
Myriam Roccatello, Director of Programs of the International Center for Transitional 
Justice ​,​ “If transitional justice is to work it needs civil society to undertake constant 
and relentless work”. This engagement should ensure that the working methods of 
the particular process are explained to all communities to prevent misunderstandings, 
challenge negative propaganda, and manage expectations. 
  
Third, transitional justice mechanisms cannot be effective if they are externally 
imposed and controlled. As noted ​ ​by the EU ​, “Transitional justice can only reach its 
goals if the process of its design and implementation is nationally and 
locally-owned…It is essential that the process is initiated and driven by government 
authorities and local civil society”. Naturally, criminal proceedings necessitate the 
cooperation of both the affected societies and their national governments; likewise, 
reconciliation cannot be achieved by external imposition, and by definition requires 




In summation, therefore, there is widespread consensus on the following; 
● transitional justice is a vital part of post-conflict recovery, 
● transitional justice is necessary on both moral and security grounds, 
● transitional justice aims to achieve justice, accountability, reconciliation and 
robust domestic judicial mechanisms, 
● the efficacy of transitional justice is dependent on a range of processes being 




 The Specialist Chambers’ Outreach 
Since its inception, the KSC has sought to mobilise an effective outreach programme; 
as Avis Beneš, Head of Public Information and Communication Unit at the KSC, noted, 
when the court was established, “there was a lot of suspicion and scepticism in 
advance, and because of that this court has to put extra effort in being perceived as 
credible and legitimate”. Beneš emphasised that the KSC immediately established the 
Public Information and Communication Unit that coordinates outreach, while noting 
that both the KSC’s President and its Registrar are very involved in communication 
and outreach activities. The KSC website has a specific outreach section in which 
factsheets ​ – in Albanian, Serbian and English – are available. Representatives from 
the KSC have organised ​ ​public meetings ​ about the court in Kosovo, and held 
information events in The Hague. Throughout 2017, KSC representatives engaged in 
“a lot of stakeholder mapping, and intensifying cooperation with civil society” in 
Kosovo’s main urban centres, as well as in Serb-majority towns such as Gracinica and 
North Mitrovica. According to Guido Acquaviva, Deputy Registrar at the KSC, the 
various initiatives launched by the KSC – including innovative outreach projects like a 
YouTube channel​ – are indicative of its “commitment to enhance outreach to a much 
higher extent than ordinary domestic courts and tribunals”. In January 2018, the​ ​Swiss 
government​ provided the KSC with a grant specifically for outreach and as a result, 
according to Beneš, “There will be an intensification of activities in next two years”. 
  
Responding to criticisms of the KSC’s outreach strategy, representatives of the KSC 
pointed to a number of factors beyond their control. First, the KSC was established 
before its working methods had been fully clarified; Guido Acquaviva explained that 
until the KSC’s rules of procedure had entered into force there was a limit to what 
they could say about how the proceedings would operate and this impacted on 
outreach; since these have been clarified, “we can more confidently explain to people 
how our proceedings will unfold”. Secondly, Avis Beneš noted that most public 
interest in the KSC has focused on indictments; given that none have been issued yet 
– and the KSC is naturally unwilling to discuss who may or may not be charged – the 
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 outreach team simply cannot address this issue and yet, according to Beneš, such 
questions “count for about 70% of our media queries”. Finally, much of the outreach 
activities undertaken are not public and thus go unnoticed. Beneš noted that when 
assessing outreach, people tend to look for “KSC representatives giving interviews 
and being constantly present in the media”, but, she noted, other types of 
communication such as consultations, information sessions, bilateral meetings, and 
background briefings, are also very important. Acquaviva echoes these sentiments, 
noting that “one should not expect these meetings to always result in us issuing press 
statements or being more visible to the public at large… Building trust with victims and 
other groups is often not a public endeavour.” 
  
Finally, representatives from the KSC were keen to emphasise that while the KSC 
does​ want to – in the words of Acquaviva – “establish ourselves as ​the ​ reliable source 
of information about ourselves”, it is not the exclusive or primary task of the KSC to 
explain itself or bolster its legitimacy. The KSC is a judicial body “established by the 
Kosovo Assembly with a two-thirds majority of the elected representatives” and it 
derives its legitimacy from this fact. Thus, those who question its necessity or remit 





 Perceptions of the Specialist Chambers 
In the course of the interviews and workshops conducted in Kosovo and Serbia about 
the KSC, a number of issues and concerns were repeatedly raised. They can be 
organised into four broad themes. 
  
The necessity/legitimacy of the KSC 
Unsurprisingly, organisations dedicated to promoting transitional justice in the former 
Yugoslavia agreed that the KSC was vital to ensuring that the communities involved 
understand what happened during the period under consideration; by identifying and 
imprisoning those responsible for criminality, the process would help foster 
reconciliation between Kosovo’s Serbian and Albanian communities, and ultimately 
improve relations between Serbia and Kosovo. In particular, many emphasised that 
the recent history of the Balkans testifies to the damaging impact ​not​ addressing the 
past can have; the conflicts in the 1990s were, many argued, a direct result of the lack 
of any inclusive reflections on the nature of the violence perpetrated during the 
Second World War. 
  
Those not involved in promoting transitional justice, however, were far less convinced 
of the need for the KSC. While few denied that the KLA had committed crimes, some 
argued that the scale had been greatly exaggerated and didn’t warrant this effort. 
Others were more critical; the Marty Report was described by some as “sponsored by 
Russia”, with Marty himself portrayed by another as “anti-American and anti-Albanian”. 
Such sentiments were, however, the minority view. 
  
The more prominent objections to the KSC were orientated around three key issues. 
First, that the KSC was ​imposed​ upon Kosovo by the international community – 
particularly the US and the EU – either to appease Serbia and/or create an image of 
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 the international community as “just and not complicit in what happened”. One 
participant noted, “There is little local ownership of the court and as a result people 
do not believe in it.” Another suggested that while the KSC is formally a Kosovo court, 
Kosovo’s people and politicians did not voluntarily choose to establish it, rather, “The 
court was established by force; like in ​The Godfather​, the internationals said ‘I will 
make you an offer you can’t refuse’.” The court was established, according to Sonja 
Biserko of the Belgrade based Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, “as an 
appeasement to Belgrade”. Second, many argued that the KSC is unfairly focused on 
Albanians despite the fact that Serbia bears the greatest responsibility for the 
violence. As Bekim Blakaj noted, “[The KSC] is not supported by most of the Albanian 
community because they consider it to be biased and unfair. There is a feeling that it 
should not be just focused on the wrongdoings of the Albanians during the war.” 
Third, many wondered why another court was required given the fact that UNMIK, the 
ICTY, EULEX and Kosovo’s own courts had jurisdiction over these allegations, and 
had in many cases held trials. 
  
Some noted, however, that most Kosovo Albanians accepted that certain KLA 
members ​had​ committed crimes and, given that these same people had subsequently 
‘captured’ the state and engaged in widespread corruption – with the support of the 
international community – they would welcome their imprisonment; as one former 
KLA fighter remarked, “I wish there were two courts for these criminals; we have to 
get rid of them all.” Additionally, while most coverage of the court within Kosovo was 
negative, some noted that this distorted popular support amongst the people who 
didn’t engage in the public debate. As Shpetim Gashi – Vice-President of the Centre 
for Inclusive Governance – noted, “There is more support for the court than it seems. 
People who support it are not as vocal as those who don’t.” In terms of the 
proceedings’ impact on Kosovo’s international reputation, Gashi remarked: “The court 
will most likely show that Albanians did some bad things too, but the idea that 
Kosovo’s reputation will suffer is not true. Our reputation cannot get any worse. In 
fact, the court might improve it.” 
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The KSC’s capacity to achieve justice 
Very few participants within Kosovo expressed faith in the capacity of the KSC to 
prosecute those responsible. These arguments centred around two claims; first, given 
that the crimes happened some 20 years ago, many witnesses will have died or 
simply forgotten the details, while the perpetrators will also have ‘cleaned up’ any 
evidence. Many suggested it is highly unlikely that witnesses will be prepared to 
testify against KLA members given that these people have become extremely 
powerful; according to Milica Andric, since 2000, many witnesses “died in mysterious 
ways or have been intimated”. Additionally, as noted by Miren Spek – spokesman for 
the Victim and Witness Support Service Croatia – the proceedings at the ICTY 
demonstrated that witness testimony about events that occurred many years ago can 
be unreliable; a witness’ own memories become blurred over time with other’s 
accounts, thereby rendering their own story inadvertently inaccurate. Second, it was 
suggested that the KSC would not have been established if the key leaders of the 
KLA had not received guarantees that they would not be prosecuted. These 
allegations centred in particular on President Hashim Thaci; there was widespread 
consensus that Thaci and the other ‘big fish’ would never be tried given their power 
within Kosovo and close ties to powerful international actors. As noted by one 
participant, “everyone knows who was behind the political violence back then, and 
yet these people have been allowed to become powerful by the internationals”. Many 
argued that Thaci and others were seen by the US and EU as integral to stability 
within Kosovo and between Kosovo and Serbia; some argued that Thaci will “threaten 
Brussels with trouble” if he feels he may face trial. This was echoed by another who in 
fact suggested that the Prime Minister and the President “see the court as a political 
body that will provide them with more leverage to do deals and engage in corruption”. 
  
The latter sentiment was particularly pervasive amongst Kosovo Serbs; the majority 
suggested that since 1999 the international community had “done nothing to stop the 
mafia taking over” and it was simply implausible that it would now turn on them. It was 
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 suggested that the KSC might be allowed “to try some low-level figures but they will 
not go after the ‘big fish’”. According to another, “There is too much corruption here 
for this to work. The internationals are corrupt too and they allow corruption to take 
place inside Kosovo.” Milica Andric suggested the KSC is unlikely to prosecute 
Kosovo Albanians for crimes against Serbs but “will have more success in prosecuting 
political murders and crimes against Albanians”. Yet, some argued that that targeting 
direct perpetrators of crimes – rather than their commanders – was not necessarily a 
flawed strategy; Milan Antonijević, from the Belgrade-based Human Rights House, 
noted that this was done in Serbia and eventually “helped to reveal bigger truths”. 
  
The KSC’s engagement with civil society/general public 
The overwhelming consensus was that people in both Kosovo and Serbia did not 
know enough about the KSC or transitional justice. According to a representative from 
the OSCE, “The basic principles of transitional justice haven’t been spoken about 
enough here.” Much of the KSC’s outreach was, some argued, cosmetic and beyond 
the reach of many ordinary people in Kosovo; as Marijana Toma argued, “They may 
have information on their website but how will they explain what they are doing to 
some elderly guy in Kosovo who doesn’t get that information and will go to a 
demonstration to throw tear-gas at the assembly?” 
  
Amongst those working on transitional justice in Serbia and Kosovo, the deficiencies 
in outreach, and the lack of understanding about the KSC that this has created, is 
seen as a major failing, though not one that can be attributed solely to the KSC. 
Rather, the Government of Kosovo was blamed for having done far too little either to 
explain the KSC to its citizens, or challenge the propaganda surrounding its remit. In 
particular, the government hasn’t done enough to help civil society organisations 
cultivate support amongst the public for the KSC. Milan Antonijević noted for the KSC 
to be successful Kosovo needed “a stronger civil society”, one that was both 
protected and supported by the government, but noted that “I do not see that kind of 
readiness in Pristina”. This was not, most claimed, unintentional; many argued that the 
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 Kosovo government, for reasons of self-preservation, have a vested interest in 
degrading public support for the KSC; as noted by ​Anna Myriam Roccatello​, “I don’t 
think the Government have explained the court’s purpose and procedures to the 
people. They are playing a double game.” 
  
The majority of Kosovo Serb participants agreed that the KSC has not been 
adequately explained or discussed. “No-one hear talk about it” was one view, while 
another participant stated, ‘”We have been given very little information about the 
court. We don’t understand it; this is especially the case in rural and poorer areas.” 
This lack of information was compounded by the fact that life for the majority of Serbs 
in Kosovo simply trying to make a living consumes most of their time; as one 
remarked, “I have to feed my children; I don’t have time to think about this court.” The 
view in Belgrade amongst civil society activists was similarly critical; noting that many 
Kosovo Serbs fled to Serbia, many argued that the KSC needed to engage with the 
Serbian public and civil society organisations. Jovana Prusina, noting that “if the court 
is discussed here it’s misinterpreted”, argued, “They should have some kind of 
presence here in Belgrade. They should communicate with our people here, our 
journalists, organise workshops in high schools, and cooperate with NGOs… Right 
now it’s perceived as something happening far away in The Hague.” Those based in 
Serbia also criticised the Serbian government’s near-complete unwillingness to 
provide information about the court to the public. 
  
The KSC’s effect on political stability in Kosovo 
Kosovo’s current self-image, many noted, is based on a particular narrative with the 
KLA described as heroic freedom fighters resisting Serbian aggression. The KSC’s 
trials will challenge this and “blur the line between the victims and the perpetrators”; 
this will, some argued, spark societal anger. Few participants predicted that the 
proceedings would cause actual violence, though most warned that it would heighten, 
rather than lessen, tensions between the Albanian and Serbian communities in 
Kosovo. Some did warn, however, that the people involved in the trials “will seek 
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 revenge”. Additionally, some argued that the proceedings would bolster 
“anti-American” sentiments in Kosovo and thereby push people either towards more 
extreme nationalist parties or Islamic fundamentalism. 
  
While some argued that the KSC could help to clean up Kosovo’s political system by, 
as Milica Andric noted, “removing powerful and corrupt public figures from their 
position of power”, others argued that it could have the opposite effect; given that the 
trials of the key leaders are likely to fail because of intimidation, those acquitted will 
return to Kosovo with their political capital greatly increased. As one noted, “You can 
see how Fatmir Limaj and ​Ramush Haradinaj ​ received more support after they were 
acquitted at the ICTY. They were then seen as heroes.” 
  
It was widely noted that, despite the fact that the Kosovo Assembly voted to create 
the KSC, no major political party in Kosovo was especially in favour of the KSC’s 
establishment; given that the current government of Kosovo comprises a so-called 
‘war wing’ coalition of three parties with direct ties to the former KLA – each of whom 
is led by leaders accused by many of complicity in war crimes – the KSC’s 
proceedings clearly have the potential to cause political instability. Additionally, many 
noted that because Kosovo has been asked by the international community to make 
many painful concessions – such as the border deal with Montenegro and the 
dialogue with Serbia – without having received much in return, there is a sense of 
‘betrayal’ that the KSC’s proceedings are likely to exacerbate; this will ultimately 






As noted earlier, prescriptions on implementing effective transitional justice – 
particularly those advanced by the UN and the EU – emphasise three key points; first, 
an array of mechanisms must be employed as judicial proceedings alone cannot 
achieve reconciliation; second, the relevant national authorities must support the 
process and promote its legitimacy among the population; third, transitional justice 
cannot work if it is – or if it is seen to be – externally imposed and managed. Building 
on these prescriptions, on the basis of the research conducted, the effectiveness of 
the KSC is dependent on meeting five key challenges; each are detailed below. 
  
The Legitimacy of the KSC 
At present the KSC suffers from both a lack of sufficient domestic support – 
particularly amongst Kosovo’s Albanian community – as well as very low expectations 
as to its ability to achieve its aims. The court is seen by the majority of the Kosovo 
Albanian community as an unwarranted foreign imposition, and unfairly focused on 
Albanians. Within this community, there remains a clear lack of understanding as to 
the KSC’s mandate and working methods, there is little acceptance that the court is 
necessary, and the very idea that KLA fighters committed crimes is widely disputed. 
While Kosovo Serbs generally support the need for the KSC, there is a widespread 
lack of understanding as to the KSC’s mandate and working methods, and few expect 




Few Albanians or Serbs in Kosovo expect the KSC to have a positive impact on 
inter-community relations. Some indeed warned that when proceedings begin, 
tensions are likely to increase. While only a minority predicted conflict, this was cited 
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 as a distinct possibility given the fact that – as noted above – the KSC is widely 
perceived as illegitimate, and an ‘attack’ on the Kosovo Albanian community’s identity. 
The proceedings, many warned, will inevitably reignite disputes over the causes, and 
nature, of the violence in the late 1990s and, in the absence of strong 
cross-community civil society and governmental support for the KSC, nationalists will 
easily stoke up hostilities. 
  
Witness Participation 
Even amongst Kosovo Albanians who support the KSC – and acknowledge that 
crimes were perpetrated by the KLA – there was a general feeling that the 
proceedings will falter due to an inability to garner sufficient witnesses. This was cited 
as due to the passage of time, but more regularly, the fact that those involved have 
already, and will continue to, intimidate potential witnesses. The collapse of a number 
of ICTY and EULEX trials of former KLA members was cited as evidence of this; 
indeed, as one EULEX prosecutor noted, “If we couldn’t protect witnesses, I don’t 
know how this court will.” 
  
Political and Societal Stability 
Many noted that Kosovo continues to suffer from high unemployment and persistent 
corruption; coupled with recent lukewarm EU statements on ​ ​Kosovo’s chances of 
joining the EU ​, there is ​ ​widespread social despair​. This has manifested itself within the 
Kosovo Albanian population in increased anger at the international community, and 
an upsurge in support for ‘anti-establishment’ parties and political Islam. Given this 
context, the sensitive nature of the KSC’s proceedings pose a significant risk; if the 
general public does not accept the legitimacy of the KSC, then the proceedings could 
well inflame the widespread societal anger and ignite unrest targeted at both the 
international presence in Kosovo and the Serb community. 
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 Kosovo’s International Reputation 
Kosovo desperately needs to fully integrate into the international system, yet this is 
being hampered by the widespread perception that it is a ‘​mafia state​’. So long as 
Kosovo is perceived as beset by endemic corruption and governed by ex-guerrillas 
with links to the criminal underworld throughout Europe, its prospects of greater 
international integration suffer. Should the KSC’s proceedings be hampered by 
witness intimidation and/or ignite social unrest and inter-ethnic violence, these 
pre-existing negative perceptions about Kosovo will continue, if not increase. 
Kosovo’s future international standing is, therefore, significantly – though not 





The KSC’s working methods and remit remain misunderstood; it is seen as an 
illegitimate foreign imposition by most of the Kosovo Albanian population; it is 
deemed likely to be ineffective by the majority of Kosovo Serbs; there is 
cross-community consensus that the proceedings are likely to inflame nationalist 
sentiments; and as an isolated judicial mechanism, the KSC cannot on its own foster 
reconciliation. To redress these potentially dangerous facts, changes should be 
enacted in three key areas; 
  
KSC Outreach 
Few – if indeed any – participants expressed satisfaction with the KCS’s outreach; the 
dominant view is that outreach has been conducted at a remote and elite level. Direct 
engagement with civil society and the general public in Kosovo and Serbia should be 
increased through an array of methods including; 
● More public meetings – beyond just the major cities – aimed at explaining the 
KSC’s remit and procedures, 
● An outreach team permanently present on the ground in Kosovo, 
● Greater coordination of activities with local civil society organisations, 
● More prominent engagement with media organisations in Kosovo and Serbia, 
● More engagement with Serbs from Kosovo who now live in Serbia, 
● Greater coordination of outreach with the governments of Kosovo and Serbia, 
and a willingness to ask each to do more, 




 Truth and Reconciliation Process 
Given the sensitive nature of the issues under its remit, the KSC’s proceedings are 
likely to increase inter-ethnic tension; in the absence of increased public support for 
the proceedings, this could well ignite violence. As an exclusively punitive judicial 
body, the KSC cannot in isolation precipitate reconciliation; to this end, the KSC must 
be complemented by a parallel process designed to promote truth and reconciliation 
rather than just establish legal guilt. To achieve this, the Government of Kosovo 
should; 
● Support civil society organisations and initiatives that seek to improve 
inter-community dialogue and interaction 
● Do more to meaningfully support a ​ ​national truth and reconciliation process​ to 
ensure it is seen as more than just a public relations exercise. Modeled on 
those initiated ​ ​elsewhere​, the process must be designed to ensure all 
communities have an opportunity to articulate their experiences in an inclusive 
and reciprocal forum. 
● Support broader region-wide initiatives focused on establishing facts about the 
collapse of Yugoslavia, in particular the ​ ​RECOM initiative ​.  
  
The Government of Kosovo’s Approach 
The overwhelming majority of respondents were highly critical of the government of 
Kosovo’s approach to explaining both the necessity and working methods of the KSC; 
it is in the Kosovo government’s interests to ensure the KSC’s proceedings do not 
cause social and/or political instability, yet to date it has done little to support the KSC. 
To ensure the people of Kosovo understand both the KSC’s remit and procedures, as 
well as to bolster its legitimacy, the government must; 
● Put more resources into educational tools explaining both transitional justice 
and the KSC, which engage directly with the general public, 
● Engage much more with civil society organisations in Kosovo to both foster 
public support for the KSC and facilitate cross-community dialogue, 
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 ● Do more to ensure that civil society organisations in Kosovo supportive of the 
KSC are protected from negative press coverage, slander and intimidation, 
● Challenge negative and erroneous media coverage of the KSC, 
● More proactively encourage witnesses to testify and ensure that potential 





When the KSC was established, the EU and US embassies in Pristina issued a​ ​joint 
statement ​ heralding the move as “an important step on Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic path”, 
and a “crucial instrument for achieving justice”. The statement concluded, “By dealing 
with its past and ensuring justice for the victims, Kosovo can achieve reconciliation 
and build a better future.” Yet on the basis of the research conducted and the 
challenges identified above, unless significant changes are made, the KSC will fail to 
enable Kosovo to achieve these goals; indeed, the proceedings may in fact damage 
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